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This article endeavours to understand
the feminist activism from which constitutional abortion rights in Canada were
born in the landmark Supreme Court
case of R v Morgentaler 1988, and the
influence of these rights on continued
feminist activism for reproductive
justice. Part I reviews abortion practice
in the “back-alley” prior to and immediately after the 1969 criminal reform with
attention to the direct service activism
of liberation feminists in their campaign
to repeal the abortion law as a matter
of constitutional justice. Part II turns to
adjudication in the courts to study how
judicial reasoning channelled these constitutional claims, exploring the continuity of ideas between feminist liberation,
the criminal defence of necessity, and
Charter rights to liberty and security
of the person. Part III reverses perspective to examine how Morgentaler
1988 shaped and ultimately de-radicalized abortion rights and a new wave of
feminist activism through the constitutional logics and institutions of markets
and medicine. The article concludes by
reflecting on what constitutional abortion rights may yet become, informed
by a vision of reproductive justice and
rooted in a collective democratic spirit.
This article is a study of the feminist
ideas and practices that shaped abortion
rights in Canada over the 150 years of its
Constitution, not least the 35 years of its
Charter, and that will continue to do so
into the future.

Cet article explore le parcours de
l’activisme féministe à l’origine des
droits constitutionnels à l’avortement au
Canada que la Cour suprême a reconnus lors de sa décision historique dans
l’affaire R v Morgentaler 1988. Il analyse
en outre l’influence que ces droits ont
exercée sur l’activisme féministe qui
s’est poursuivi en faveur de la justice
reproductive. La Partie I passe en revue
la pratique de l’avortement clandestin avant et immédiatement après la
réforme du droit criminel entreprise
en 1969 en mettant l’accent sur l’activisme des féministes qui revendiquait
des services directs dans le cadre de
leur campagne visant à faire abroger la
loi sur l’avortement à titre de question
de justice constitutionnelle. La Partie
II étudie, par le prisme de la jurisprudence, la manière dont le raisonnement
judiciaire a mis à profit ces revendications constitutionnelles, en explorant
la continuité des idées existant entre le
mouvement de libération des femmes, le
moyen de défense fondé sur la nécessité,
et les droits à la liberté et la sécurité
de la personne garantis par la Charte.
La Partie III inverse le point de vue afin
d’examiner la manière dont l’arrêt Morgentaler 1988 a façonné et finalement
« dé-radicalisé » les droits à l’avortement
et amené une nouvelle vague d’activisme féministe par le biais de la logique
constitutionnelle et des institutions
des marchés et de la médecine. L’article
conclut par une réflexion sur ce que les
droits constitutionnels à l’avortement
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pourraient encore devenir, éclairés par
une vision de la justice reproductive
et ancrés dans un esprit démocratique
collectif. Cet article présente une étude
des pensées et pratiques féministes qui
ont façonné les droits à l’avortement
au Canada au cours des 150 années de
sa Constitution, et non les moindres 35
années de sa Charte, et qui continueront
sur cette voie à l’avenir.
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Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights in
Canada
Joanna N. Erdman*

INTRODUCTION
Ottawa figures as an important place on the 35th anniversary of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter),1 and the 150th anniversary of the
Constitution Act (Constitution).2 Ottawa is also an important place for the
constitutionalization of abortion rights in Canada, but not for the reasons one may first assume — namely that Ottawa is the seat of Parliament
and home to the Supreme Court of Canada (the Court). Ottawa was a
critical site for the women’s liberation movement. In 1970, it marked the
destination of the cross-country Abortion Caravan, which carried women’s
liberation activists to Parliament Hill to demand the repeal of the 1969
criminal abortion law.3 The caravaners announced their arrival with a
*

1
2
3

MacBain Chair in Health Law and Policy, Associate Professor, Schulich School of Law,
Dalhousie University. I am much indebted to the scholars, biographers, archivists and
memoirists who have preserved the inspiring efforts and achievements of Canadian
reproductive justice activism on which we may build an equally inspiring future. Thank
you as well to Adam Dodek and the organizers of the conference, The Charter and
Emerging Issues in Constitutional Rights and Freedoms: From 1982 to 2032, for the opportunity to present my research, and to the editors of the Ottawa Law Review for their
careful and dedicated assistance.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II, No 5.
Criminal Code, RSC 1970, c C-34, s 251. See Christabelle Sethna & Steve Hewitt, “Clandestine Operations: The Vancouver Women’s Caucus, the Abortion Caravan, and the RCMP”
(2009) 90:3 Can Historical Rev 463; Frances Jane Wasserlein, “An Arrow Aimed at the
Heart”: The Vancouver Women’s Caucus and the Abortion Campaign, 1969–1971 (MA Thesis,
Simon Fraser University Department of History, 1990) [unpublished].
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blistering letter to then Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and his Ministers
of Health and Justice, which read:
We are FURIOUS WOMEN in a nation that does not recognize or respect
our basic rights as human beings and citizens of Canada.
We charge the Government of Canada with violation of its responsibility and trust to serve all of its citizens. We charge the Government of
Canada with the following:
1. Of being responsible for the MURDER BY ABORTION of 2,000 CANADIAN WOMEN who die each year from illegal abortions.
2. Of being responsible for the hospitalization and possible mutilation of
20,000 WOMEN, who enter hospitals for treatment of complications
arising from illegal abortions.
3. Of being responsible for the psychological, physiological and economic oppression and degradation of thousands of women who forced
into unwanted motherhood …
We, therefore, demand … [t]hat Abortion (Section 237) be removed from
the Criminal Code of Canada …
We are angry, furious women and we demand our right to human
dignity.4

Twenty-five years later, local abortion rights activists issued a similar
charge and demand in a quieter encounter in Charlottetown, Prince Edward
Island (PEI). A veteran activist stepped onto the elevator of a government
administration building, greeted by the PEI Premier who asked “[y]ou’re
coming up to see us this morning?”5 Indeed she was to serve notice of an
intention to challenge the province’s restrictive abortion policy as a violation of women’s Charter rights, and to bring local and safe abortion services back to the Island.6 Months later, with no case won or even litigated,
4

5
6

Letter from Women’s Caucus of Vancouver to Prime Minister P.E. Trudeau and the Ministers of Health and Justice, re: Women’s Rights — Abortion (19 March 1970), online: <www.
morgentaler25years.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/womens-caucus-letter-1970.pdf>
[emphasis in original]. The letter was reprinted in the April 1970 edition of The Pedestal,
Canada’s first feminist periodical, launched in September 1969 as the voice of the Vancouver Women’s Caucus (see “Open Letter to the Prime Minister” (1970) 3:2 The Pedestal 8,
online: <riseupfeministarchive.ca/publications/the-pedestal/pedestal_02_03>).
Personal communication from Colleen MacQuarrie, University of Prince Edward Island
(5 January 2016) [on file with author].
Letter from Nasha Nijhawan, Nijhawan McMillan Barristers to Michele Dorsey, Deputy
Attorney General, re: Abortion Access Now PEI Inc v Government of PEI (5 January 2016)
[on file with author] (notice of intended proceedings under section 10(2) of the Crown
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the Premier announced that his government would not contest the challenge. He agreed the provincial abortion policy was likely unconstitutional.7
“The character of all places changes and evolves,” he said, “[i]t’s one of those
things that comes at its time.”8
The objective of this article is precisely to study how constitutional
abortion rights in Canada change and evolve over time. Most would begin
such an analysis with R v Morgentaler (Morgentaler 1988).9 In this landmark
5:2 ruling, the Supreme Court of Canada struck down the 1969 criminal
abortion law as unconstitutional, and with Parliament’s failure, and later
lack of desire, to enact a new law, abortion in Canada remains decriminalized today. Yet, in Morgentaler 1988, the Supreme Court was deeply divided
as to how to frame the abortion right.10 Three different opinions formed the
majority, with none achieving more than two signatures.11 This diversity in
constitutional meaning, however, predates and postdates Morgentaler 1988.
This feature of abortion rights reflects a more general phenomenon of constitutional rights: the ways in which rights carry multiple meanings, some
dominant and others marginal, and how this mix of meaning changes over
time. Sometimes this change happens in a paradigmatic shift — o
 mnibus
criminal law reform or a Supreme Court judgment. Sometimes it occurs
outside formal lawmaking and unmarked by legal judgment: a caravan on
Parliament Hill or a hand-delivered envelope. Thus, that Morgentaler 1988
remains the reference case for abortion rights today marks not stability in
constitutional law, but rather the remarkable capacity for abortion rights
both to accommodate and to shape normative change.

7
8
9

10

11

Proceedings Act, RSPEI 1988, c C-32). See also Abortion Access Now PEI Inc v The Government
of Prince Edward Island, PEI Sup Ct (Draft Notice of Application), online: <www.leaf.ca/
wp-content/uploads/2016/01/AAN-PEI-050116-Draft-Notice-of-Application.pdf> [AAN
Application].
Sean Fine, “PEI Drops Opposition to Abortion, Plans to Provide Access by Year’s End”,
The Globe and Mail (31 March 2016), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com>.
Ibid.
R v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30, 63 OR (2d) 281 [Morgentaler 1988 cited to SCR]. See e.g.
Rachael Johnstone, After Morgentaler: The Politics of Abortion in Canada (Vancouver: UBC
Press, 2017) [Johnstone, After Morgentaler] (examines the state of abortion rights and
access in Canada today against historical developments since Morgentaler 1988).
The article acknowledges that the Charter does not expressly or directly guarantee a “right
to abortion.” The Court in Morgentaler 1988 variably constructed abortion-related rights
from constitutional guarantees of the freedom of conscience, and the rights to life, liberty,
security of the person, and equality under sections 2, 7 and 15 of the Charter.
This is not uncommon in constitutional abortion law. See discussion of a divided US
Supreme Court in Roe v Wade, 10 US 113 (1973) in Nan D Hunter, “Justice Blackmun, Abortion, and the Myth of Medical Independence” (2006) 72:1 Brook L Rev 147 at 177–88.
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The article therefore does not study constitutional abortion rights
through legal doctrine alone, but situates Morgentaler 1988 in historical context. Structured as a retrospective and prospective case study, it
endeavours to understand the feminist activism from which constitutional
abortion rights were born, as well as the influences of these rights on continued feminist activism for reproductive justice. It is a socio-legal analysis
based on the relationship between doctrine and discourse, law and politics, and the state and its members. The article takes seriously the idea
that abortion rights are not forged in legal text or doctrine, but by those
who claim and organize around them and the institutions of the state that
give meaning and expression to them. Together, these claims and demands,
and the ideas and practices that shape and express them, over time and in
new political contexts, have fundamentally shifted the meaning of abortion
rights in Canada over the 150 years of its Constitution, not least the 35 years
of its Charter, and will continue to do so into the future.
Part I briefly reviews the state of abortion law and practice prior to and
immediately after the 1969 criminal abortion law reform, with attention
to feminist activism through direct service provision as part of a national
campaign to repeal the criminal law as a matter of constitutional justice.
Throughout this review, the article emphasizes abortion as a site of overlapping feminist discourse. The campaign for repeal was radical in its
opposition to patriarchal culture, left in its critique of capitalist society,
and liberal in its demands for legal rights and equality.12 The capacity for
abortion rights to carry multiple meanings was present in the very claim
for them, which was critical to broad-based feminist support for them
across different political commitments.
Part II turns to the courts, including Morgentaler 1988 and the three
opinions that formed the plurality judgment of the Supreme Court. The
article draws attention, in particular, to differences in how each judge
responded to and channelled feminist constitutional claims in their reasoning. This part begins by exploring the continuity of constitutional ideas
between feminist liberation action and the defence of necessity in the
physician civil disobedience trials that ultimately led to the constitutional
challenge in Morgentaler 1988. The physicians’ argument that their clandestine services were necessary to avoid the graver harm of obeying the
law, and the Supreme Court’s engagement with this argument, gave voice
12 See Linda Briskin, “Socialist Feminism: From the Standpoint of Practice” (1989) 30 Studies in Political Economy 87.
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to liberation feminists’ clandestine service provision as political action
necessitated by the injustice of the criminal law. Dr. Morgentaler and his
colleagues endeavoured to put the law on trial, and with the introduction of the Charter, they could do so directly. In turning to the landmark
Morgentaler 1988 judgment, the article explores how the Court’s section 7
security of person analysis both reaffirmed the feminist view of abortion
rights as resistance against an unjust state, but also de-radicalized this
resistance by reconstituting abortion rights as a right to access safe and
timely therapeutic care. Abortion rights suffered the same fate in the lone
opinion of Justice Wilson, who reconstituted abortion rights in a liberal
feminist tradition as a private right of personal choice unencumbered by
the state.
Part III reverses the direction of influence to examine how Morgentaler
1988 shaped popular understandings of abortion rights, and a new wave
of activism within a new political climate. The article studies the ways
in which liberal abortion rights exacerbated, rather than alleviated, social
inequalities in access by cutting a constitutional path to the withdrawal of
the state from and the privatization of abortion care. Against this outcome,
feminist activists returned to the narrower security rights of Morgentaler
1988, and the promise of universal abortion access in the Canadian health
care system. Yet, by channelling feminist activism through the logic and
institutions of the health care system, the politics of abortion became the
politics of health care. Charter litigation over abortion funding, for example,
took on the same market rationality that dominated health care policy
debates generally. Moreover, when feminist activism eventually succeeded,
and abortion care was integrated into the health care system, it changed
more than it changed the system; appropriating, if not reproducing, many
of the institutional norms of state and medical authority that liberation
feminists railed against. Collective rights in the service of political emancipatory ends became individual rights of free and informed consent in
the receipt of medical services. Within the health care system, feminist
action turned inward, toward the private, personal space that liberal abortion rights had carved for it, rather than outwards towards collective political action.
The article concludes with a reflection on what constitutional abortion
rights may yet become by reference to the 2016 constitutional abortion challenge in PEI. It does so by following the constitutional “road not travelled”
in the vision of reproductive justice: namely abortion rights as a demand
for democratic inclusion and participation, rooted in the real and material
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needs of women’s reproductive lives, and the social and economic institutions that shape them.
I. FEMINIST ACTIVISM IN THE BACK-ALLEY
Before the constitutionalization of abortion, there was the commonplace
of abortion. In 19th century Canada, abortion, like most health care, was
left to family and community arrangements, and to self-care in a growing commercial market.13 Trained midwives, often relatives or neighbours,
presided over birth and its termination in the privacy of the home. A new
market in abortifacients, patent medicines, and ladies’ remedies, also gave
literate women of the white middle class an alternative modern option.
This market turned what had been a private domestic practice into an
entrepreneurial enterprise for profit, leading some historians “to speak of
an ‘abortion epidemic’” among this social class.14
Against this commercialization of abortion, a professionalizing medical elite campaigned for the expanded criminalization of abortion in the
mid-19th century.15 The campaign formally centered on two objectives: first,
to condemn and to prohibit the intentional destruction of fetal life; and
second, to prevent harm to women.16 State intervention was justified partly
13 See Hester Lessard, “The Construction of Health Care and the Ideology of the Private in
Canadian Constitutional Law” (1993) 2 Ann Health L 121 at 123–31 [Lessard, “Construction
of Health Care”] (for a discussion on the construction of health care in 19th century Canada).
14 See Angus McLaren, “Illegal Operations: Women, Doctors, and Abortion, 1886–1939”
(1993) 26:4 J Social History 797 at 797 [McLaren, “Illegal Operations”]; Angus McLaren,
“Birth Control and Abortion in Canada, 1870–1920” (1978) 59:3 Can Historical Rev 319 at
329–330 [McLaren, “Birth Control and Abortion”]. See also WA Dafoe, “The Types and
Treatment of Abortions” (1930) 22:6 CMAJ 793; Shelley AM Gavigan, “On ‘Bringing on
the Menses’: The Criminal Liability of Women and the Therapeutic Exception in Canadian Abortion Law” (1986) 1:2 CJWL 279 [Gavigan, “‘Bringing on the Menses’”] (“[w]ell
into the twentieth century, the belief persisted among … English [Canadian] women that
self-induced abortion before the third month of pregnancy was legal” at 301).
15 With Confederation in 1867, Canada inherited England’s Offences Against the Person Act,
1861(UK), 24 & 25 Vict, c C, but in 1869 would enact its own criminal law on abortion,
drawing on pre-Confederation provincial statutes. When The Criminal Code, 1892, SC
1982, c 29 was consolidated in 1892, it incorporated this 1869 law on abortion. See Shelley
Gavigan, “The Criminal Sanction as it Relates to Human Reproduction: The Genesis of the
Statutory Prohibition of Abortion” (1984) 5:1 J Leg Hist 20 (for an extended study of the
criminalization of abortion in Canada).
16 See Angus McLaren & Arlene Tigar McLaren, The Bedroom and the State: The Changing
Practices and Politics of Contraception and Abortion in Canada, 1880–1980 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1986) (for a fuller discussion of the 19th century criminalization of abortion and its many aims).
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on an idealized vision of the medical profession saving women from the
corruptions of the abortion market, which included the trade of irregular
practitioners (so-called “quacks”) but also the clandestine services of maverick physicians.17 The moral and health aims of the law thus combined in
the single figure of the physician. Abortionists practiced a trade for private
profit. Physicians served the public interest in health and justice. Yet, the
truth was that many abortionists were physicians.
Criminalization did not outlaw abortion practice so much as it revealed
it, regulated it, and distributed its risks.18 Criminalization shaped the abortion market. Poor and working-class women were largely confined to the
vagaries of the back alley. Women with means turned to private spaces,
the seclusion of a physician’s office, or a maternity home.19 Criminalization classed abortion on the terms and location of its practice, the status
of its providers, and the women seeking their services. Shelley Gavigan
also documented the rare but practiced provision of “therapeutic abortion” by physicians in hospitals, offered under tacit agreement to women
of standing and concealed in clinical records by medical euphemism:
emergency appendectomy, menstrual regulation, or dilation and curettage.20 These physicians were not indifferent to the risk of criminal liability, aware perhaps of the common law defence of necessity. Yet, Gavigan
notes their actions were likely guided more by the protections of professional autonomy, which both shielded their work from public scrutiny
17 McLaren, “Birth Control and Abortion”, supra note 14 at 329. In her review of abortion cases
in Ontario at the turn of the century, Constance Backhouse notes that state authorities
tended to target the “abortionist” rather than the woman (see Constance B Backhouse,
“Involuntary Motherhood: Abortion, Birth Control and the Law in Nineteenth Century Canada” (1983) 3 Windsor YB Access Just 61 at 71, 83). In these trials, respectable physicians
placed themselves with the state, often eliciting dying declarations from women to furnish
evidence against the accused (see Susanne Klausen, “Doctors and Dying Declarations: The
Role of the State in Abortion Regulation in British Columbia, 1917–37” (1996) 13:1 Can Bull
Medical History 53). See Wendy Mitchinson, The Nature of Their Bodies: Women and Their
Doctors in Victorian Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991) at 130–44 (for a study
on the medical profession’s role generally in the criminalization of abortion in Canada).
18 Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Abortion and Woman’s Choice: The State, Sexuality and
Reproductive Freedom, revised ed (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1990) at 67.
19 Ontario was the first province to pass legislation specifically regulating maternity homes,
An Act to regulate Maternity Boarding Houses and for the Protection of Infant Children, SO 1897,
c 52. Manitoba followed with a similar statute, An Act respecting Maternity Boarding Houses
and for the Protection of Infant Children, SM 1899, c 21. See McLaren, “Birth Control and
Abortion”, supra note 14 (“[t]he medical journals carried numerous articles warning physicians to turn a deaf ear to the pleas of patients” at 332).
20 Gavigan, “‘Bringing on the Menses’”, supra note 14.
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and distinguished their work from criminal abortionists.21 By the 20th century, abortion within hospitals was increasingly carried out in the open,
with physicians obtaining concurring opinions from fellow physicians
and department heads, and formal consent of husbands and parents: the
public authority of law deferring to the male authorities of medicine and
family. By the 1960s, many hospitals formalized these practices in committees, which gave physicians an institutional level of protection.22
The 1969 criminal abortion law reform, challenged in Morgentaler 1988,
decriminalized physician-provided hospital-based abortions if a committee approved the abortion as necessary to protect the life or health of the
pregnant woman.23 The reform left the criminal prohibitions on abortion
otherwise intact. It, therefore, did not liberalize access to abortion care so
much as it legally sanctioned the status quo.24 This legal sanction, however,
proved highly significant in the constitutionalizing of abortion.
By legislating limits on who may provide and access lawful abortion,
and where they may do so, the reform was arguably designed to better
achieve the two primary objectives of the criminal law: first, to condemn
and prevent the intentional destruction of fetal life by ensuring the excuse
of “therapeutic abortion” was not abused, and second, to prevent harm
to women by ensuring that abortion was performed by skilled providers
in safe conditions. What the 1969 reform achieved, in fact, was formal
sanction of a class-based system of abortion access. The therapeutic-hospital committee system reflected all of the inequities of the pre-reform
market in abortion access. Class and other social bias were overwhelming
in committee authorizations of therapeutic need, which the law left to
21 Ibid at 298.
22 See Jane Jenson, “Getting to Morgentaler: From One Representation to Another” in Janine
Brodie, Shelley AM Gavigan & Jane Jenson, eds, The Politics of Abortion (Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 1992) 16 at 24–25.
23 Criminal Code, supra note 3, s 251.
24 The Canadian Medical Association and Canadian Bar Association jointly lobbied for
the reform to clarify the law, and the federal government described the objective of the
reform as such, that is, as doing nothing more “than recogniz[ing] what has actually been
happening in a number of hospitals with respect to therapeutic abortions,” (see House of
Commons Debates, 28th Parl, 1st Sess, Vol 8 (28 April 1969) at 8058 (Hon John N Turner)
[House of Commons Debates, 1969]). The effect of the amendment was thus largely confined
to making expressly legal a number of abortions most of which would have been performed anyway (see Jenson, supra note 22; Melissa Haussman, “Of Rights and Power: Canada’s Federal Abortion Policy, 1969–1991” in Dorothy McBride Stetson, ed, Abortion Politics,
Women’s Movements, and the Democratic State: A Comparative Study of State Feminism (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2001) 63 at 66–67 [Haussman, “Of Rights and Power”]).
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professional medical judgment without guidance or oversight.25 Women
had no right to appear before committees and no right of appeal from
them. The committees rarely gave any reasons for denial.
Yet, certain systemic patterns in the administration of the law emerged.
Married, white, middle class women, who could afford a family physician
of good standing, fared better in approvals — especially if willing or able
to bear the label of “mentally unstable” in their medical records.26 For
women of colour, Indigenous women, and women living with disabilities
or in poverty, the cost of a rare approval was greater. Authorizations, for
example, were granted on condition of consent to sterilization, with the
committee system serving as an informal mechanism of coercive sterilization.27 The 1969 reform also diminished access by creating an institutional
means to stop what had otherwise been an informal, decentralized practice. By the mid-1970s, making it through the “bureaucratic hoop” became
more difficult when anti-choice activists occupied hospital boards to set
up rigid approval guidelines, quotas, consent and other eligibility requirements, leading to a near or complete withdrawal of services. 28 Qualifying hospitals were always free under the law to set up committees or not.
Most declined, and the boards of other hospitals forced their committees
into abeyance.29
For women who made it through the approval system, a shortage of
operating room time, and a lack of equipment and training created a scarcity
25 House of Commons Debates, 1969, supra note 24 (John Turner) (the term health was left
undefined because according to then Justice Minister Turner, “health is incapable of definition, and this will be left to the good professional judgment of medical practitioners to
decide” at 8124).
26 See Canada, Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Abortion Law, Catalogue No
J2-30/1977 (chair: Robin F Badgley) (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada,
1977) at 211 [Badgley Report] (the vast majority of abortions reported under the criminal
regime were authorized for reasons associated with mental health).
27 Ibid at 360. Reports also document that abortion committees incorporated economic
need and other social considerations related to the perceived fitness to parent into health
assessments under the criminal law (see Karen Stote, An Act of Genocide: Colonialism and
the Sterilization of Aboriginal Women (Winnipeg: Fernwood Publishing, 2015) at 75–77
(describing the coercive sterilization of Aboriginal women through hospital-based abortion practices under the 1969 criminal law)).
28 See e.g. Katrina Ackerman, “In Defence of Reason: Religion, Science, and the Prince
Edward Island Anti-Abortion Movement, 1969–1988” (2014) 31:2 Can Bull Medical History
117 at 123, 129 [Ackerman, “In Defence of Reason”] (prolife activists in PEI used this channel to effectively cease the provision of lawful services on the Island by the mid-1970s; a
hospital committee last approved an abortion on the Island in 1982 and no hospital committee was operating in the province by 1986).
29 See Badgley Report, supra note 26 at 305.
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driving further access inequality.30 This scarcity, and the precariousness of
access it created trickled down into the lives of women: the need to call
and call again, hospital after hospital — regardless of work, child and family
care, or the threat of violence — in order to secure an appointment.31 Once
inside the hospital, some women experienced abusive or degrading treatment, an experience sometimes more distressing and degrading than seeking services in the clandestine market outside it.32
The 1969 reform forced many women into the backstreets to seek abortion services outside the hospital and the law.33 Yet, by the early 1970s, the
backstreets looked different than their 19th century counterparts. A new
wave of feminists had taken on abortion access as a political cause, understood as a basic precondition to women’s liberation and a fundamental
right of Canadian citizenship.34 Common among the mainly young, white,
middle-class university women who formed the women’s liberation movement was a view of women as an oppressed class, and the need to reform

30 Katrina Ackerman, A Region at Odds: Abortion Politics in the Maritime Provinces, 1969-1988
(PhD Thesis, University of Waterloo, 2015) [unpublished] [Ackerman, A Region at Odds]
(Ackerman describes how “[t]he regulation strained hospital resources, created resentment amongst staff, and caused many hospitals to impose extra legal barriers to decrease
the number of abortion procedures performed” at 18).
31 Ann Thomson, Winning Choice on Abortion: How British Columbian and Canadian Feminists
Won the Battles of the 1970s and 1980s (Victoria: Trafford Publishing, 2004) (Thomson
describes how “[o]n the one morning a week when The Toronto General Hospital scheduled abortions, only those who managed to get through to the switchboard by 10am had
a chance … regardless of jobs, children [etc] … ‘you [had to] keep dialing and dialing. There
[was] no other way. And by the time you [got] through, all the appointments [were] taken.
So you start again’ at another hospital” at 118–9).
32 Ackerman, A Region at Odds, supra note 30 (the waiting room in the Termination of Pregnancy Unit at the Halifax hospital was notorious for its seemingly intentional discomfort
and humiliation. Women were crammed into a tiny room the size of a bathroom or closet,
wearing nothing more than a hospital gown or “Johnny-shirt” at 148).
33 McLaren, “Birth Control and Abortion”, supra 14 (“if … the recourse to quack potions,
home remedies, and back street abortions teaches us anything, it is that there was at the
turn of the century — as there is today — a demand for abortion and if that demand is not
met by the medical profession it will be met by others” at 340).
34 Jenson, supra note 22 (the women’s movement was not a primary actor in the 1960s abortion debates; Jenson explains that “women had not yet developed the powerful collective
identity with which they could name themselves and act on a gender-based solidarity” at 21).
See generally Thomson, supra note 31; Wasserlein, supra note 3; Judy Rebick, Ten Thousand
Roses: The Making of a Feminist Revolution (Toronto: Penguin, 2005); Beth Palmer, Choices and
Compromises: The Abortion Movement in Canada 1969–1988 (PhD Dissertation, York University, 2012) [unpublished] (for a rich study of liberation feminist activism on abortion).
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the social and economic structures that disadvantaged women as a class.35
The criminal abortion law, a state system of reproductive oppression,
became a paradigmatic structure in need of reform. Liberation feminists
mobilized around a single demand to repeal the law and found common
cause in the fight for legal and publicly funded freestanding abortion clinics.36 The activist discourse on repeal was popular in nature and captured
multiple currents of feminist thought within the liberation movement.
Among the most prominent was radical feminism, which located the primary cause of women’s oppression in patriarchy, and Marxist or socialist
feminism, which tied women’s liberation to the end of capitalism.
Radical liberation feminists emphasized the female body as an object of
liberation (“My Body, My Property”) and control over it as a means to free
women from sexual slavery and forced motherhood in a patriarchal order.
They demanded the state “Keep its Laws off” women’s bodies, and saw the
injustice of the criminal abortion law as ceding control over women’s sexuality and fertility to medical men. Socialist feminists, in contrast, focused
on women’s economic oppression. Allied with other new left movements
critical of both state and capital, they did not frame abortion in terms of
bodily control or property. Rather, they linked abortion, or more broadly,
women’s control over whether and when to reproduce, to a series of social
goods — childcare, pay equity, parental leave, and affordable housing — in
a radical restructuring of the economy to compensate women for their
reproductive labour, and to allow women full control over their labour.
Historical records show that the “typical” criminal abortion case in the
20th century involved married women, many already mothers, who turned
35 See generally Nancy Adamson, Linda Briskin & Margaret McPhail, Feminist Organizing
for Change: The Contemporary Women’s Movement in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University
Press, 1988); Nancy Adamson, “Feminists, Libbers, Lefties and Radicals: The Emergence
of the Women’s Liberation Movement” in Joy Parr, ed, A Diversity of Women: Ontario,
1945–1980 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995) 252 (for discussion of liberation
feminism in Canada).
36 See generally Lorna Weir, “Left Popular Politics in Canadian Feminist Abortion Organizing, 1982–1991” (1994) 20:2 Feminist Studies 249 (it is important to note that many Quebec feminists supported, but did not take an active role in the national campaign to repeal
the criminal law, refusing on principle to recognize the authority of Parliament on this or
any other issue. Feminist liberation politics in Quebec were deeply connected to national
liberation struggles in Canada. Their commitment to liberation demanded abortion rights
as part of the rights of all oppressed québécois. Patriarchal oppression was understood as
part of the colonial domination of English Canada). See also Louise Desmarais, Mémoires
d’une bataille inachevée : la lutte pour l’avortement au Québec 1970–1992 (Montréal: Trait
D’union, 1999).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3197975

235

236

Revue de droit d’Ottawa

•

49:1 | Ottawa Law Review

•

49:1

to abortion in economic need.37 Socialist liberation feminists, therefore,
saw the a primary injustice of the criminal law in its structuring of abortion access on the basis of class inequalities, and later, other social inequalities with growing alliances and greater representation among women of
colour, immigrants, and lesbian women in the movement.38
Radical and socialist feminists disagreed on many issues, and many feminists within the liberation movement were not purist in thought, drawing
on multiple feminisms in their campaign against the criminal abortion
law. Whether the law forced women to beg men for control of their bodies,
functioned as a eugenic tool to sterilize women of color, reflected a failure
of the capitalist state to govern in the interests of the people, or denied
women a right of personal autonomy in this most private of decisions, feminists collectively agreed that the criminal law must be repealed. The movement united in the belief that women’s oppression could be overcome only
through structural change. Abortion was never treated as a single issue,
and access to services was never the only or ultimate goal. In 1971, the
Executive Director of the Toronto Women’s Liberation Caucus explained
why feminists collectively focused on the abortion issue. Abortion, she said,
touched all women, “even women who are only beginning to be affected by
the radical ideas of our time can identify with this issue.”39 Abortion was a
37 Angus McLaren & Arlene Tigar McLaren, The Bedroom and the State: The Changing Practices
and Politics of Contraception and Abortion in Canada, 1880–1997, 2nd ed (Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 1997) at 32–35.
38 See e.g. Wasserlein, supra note 3 (describing how the Vancouver Women’s Caucus, for
example, engaged with the class structuring of abortion access and reproductive control
in their work). Left politics continued to mark feminist abortion activism into the 1980s,
embraced by organizations such as the Ontario Coalition for Abortion Clinics (OCAC)
that “employed the language of reproductive freedom and crisis of access to signal the
social stratification of abortion service delivery in terms of class, race, and region” and
to form a politic bloc among women divided by racial, class, ethnic, and regional grounds
(Weir, supra note 36 at 250, 260). OCAC was formed in 1982 by women health care workers from the Immigrant Women’s Health Centre, Hassle Free Clinic, and the Birth Control
and V.D. Information Centre in Toronto, who challenged the discriminatory application
of the criminal law that effectively denied access to abortion for their clients: women of
colour, Aboriginal women, and working class women. See Carolyn Egan & Linda Gardner,
“Race, Class and Reproductive Freedom: Women Must Have Real Choices!” (1994) 14:2 Can
Woman Studies 95 [Egan & Gardner, “Race, Class and Reproductive Freedom”]; Carolyn
Egan & Linda Gardner, “Racism, Women’s Health, and Reproductive Freedom,” in Enakshi
Dua & Angela Robertson, eds, Scratching the Surface: Canadian, Anti-racist Feminist Thought
(Toronto: Women’s Press, 1999) 295, 300–06 [Egan & Gardner, “Race, Women’s Health
and Reproductive Freedom”].
39 Lis Angus, “Why Feminists Focus on Issue of Abortion” Labor Challenge (22 November
1971), online: <www.socialisthistory.ca>.
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more radicalizing issue than the vote because “it [led] women to consider
other issues, other ways in which their lives [were] limited.”40 Abortion
could raise the consciousness of masses of Canadian women and bring
them into united struggle. Abortion was a means to reach women, and
build a movement for social and political change.
The participatory politics and direct-action tactics of liberation feminists led to their involvement in the provision of abortion services. They
worked to remedy the immediate crisis of access and to meet women’s
existing needs. Through information and referral networks, feminist groups
assisted women to find sympathetic and skilled clandestine providers or
to access newly legalized services in the United States.41 They searched for
and inspected clandestine providers to whom they could refer women in
trust. These networks were foundational to the later building of women’s
community health clinics across Canada.42 Front-line activists assisted
women in distrust of medical authority and in defiance of state authority.
Feminist networks offered women an alternative to commercial for-profit
brokerages, which exploited the crisis of access created by the criminal
law to extract exorbitant fees from women.43
The goal of service delivery as feminist action, however, was ultimately
to politicize the masses of women who came for help: to raise their consciousness about the structures of oppression in women’s lives, and to
thereby bring them into a movement for women’s liberation. The service-
provision work of liberation feminists, in other words, was building a
40 Ibid.
41 See e.g. Thomson, supra note 31 at 21 (discussion of Vancouver Women’s Caucus’ Abortion
Information Service); Beth Palmer, “‘Lonely, Tragic, but Legally Necessary Pilgrimages’:
Transnational Abortion Travel in the 1970s” (2011) 92:4 Can Historical Rev 637 at 638 (discussion of Vancouver Women’s Caucus’ Abortion Information Service). See also Christabelle
Sethna & Marion Doull, “Accidental Tourists: Canadian Women, Abortion Tourism, and
Travel” (2012) 41:4 Women’s Studies 457 at 463–64; Christabelle Sethna et al, “Choice,
Interrupted: Travel and Inequality of Access to Abortion Services Since the 1960s” (2013)
71 J Can Labour Studies 29 at 33–38 (discussion of women’s domestic and international
border crossings for abortion services after the 1969 reform including as documented in
the 1977 Badgley Report).
42 See e.g. Aldean Stachiw, Manitoba’s Abortion Story: The Fight for Women’s Reproductive
Autonomy: 1969–2005 (MA Thesis, University of Manitoba Faculty of Graduate Studies,
2006) [unpublished] (discussion of Winnipeg’s Pregnancy Information Service, which
became the Women’s Health Clinic, the first women’s health clinic in the country at 76).
43 See Badgley Report, supra note 26 383–86 (the Badgley Report criticized the opportunistic
nature of the commercial abortion referral agencies and argued that the referral agencies
existed because “there was a demand for their services which was not otherwise being
met” at 386).
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constitutional culture of women’s rights. These were the democratic
beginnings of constitutional abortion rights. Liberation feminists argued
that the government had responsibilities and obligations to women as citizens. They worked to make visible the ways in which the criminal law controlled women, and claimed their security, freedom, and equality against
its oppression.
Their constitutional demands would eventually meet up with the
Charter through a direct challenge to the therapeutic-hospital committee
system, which the 1969 criminal law institutionalized. Feminist service
provision networks worked in the shadows of this broken system, bearing
witness to its injustices. Before referring women to clandestine providers,
groups such as the Vancouver Women’s Caucus first worked legal channels,
seeking to persuade physicians to refer women to hospital committees and
shepherding them through the process, but they were rarely successful.44
A more common practice was physicians sending women to feminist networks for referrals. Activists used this outflow to show the dysfunction and
hypocrisy of the system. Winnipeg groups, for example, picketed hospitals and demanded they make their abortion statistics available. They later
used this information to pamphlet the city and publicize the inadequacy of
public services.45 Sometimes these pressure tactics worked, and provincial
governments promised to improve access and many local hospitals did.46
It was, however, the Government of Canada’s own commissioned study
that would eventually bring change. The 1977 Report of the Committee on the
Operation of the Abortion Law (the Badgley Report) “told the government
what many Canadian women knew first-hand …[the] procedure provided
in the Criminal Code for obtaining therapeutic abortion [was] illusory
for many Canadian women.”47 The Badgley Report vindicated the feminist
44 Wasserlein, supra note 3 at 71–72 (the Vancouver Women’s Caucus saw and used its abortion counseling and referral service as a means to pressure the Therapeutic Abortion Committee at the Vancouver General Hospital to speed up processing of abortion requests and
ensure that women seeking abortions through the Committee system had the necessary
support). Thomson, supra note 31 at 19 (during its first four months of operation, the Vancouver Women’s Caucus’ abortion information service assisted 300 women, only ten of
whom successfully obtained an abortion in the hospital system).
45 Stachiw, supra note 42 at 79.
46 Wasserlein, supra note 3 at 107–08 (describing how members of the Vancouver’s Women’s
Caucus and the women they were assisting occupied psychiatrist offices at the Vancouver
General Hospital in demand for greater access to services, and the belief that the occupation was in some measure responsible for the increased availability of services).
47 Rebick, supra note 34 at 157. See generally Badgley Report, supra note 26 at 3 (in September
1975, the Federal Minister of Justice appointed a three-member committee to “conduct a
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liberation claim: the 1969 criminal law sanctioned a class-based system
of abortion access that had threatened the freedom, security and equality of Canadian women for over a century. The report recommended an
answer to this injustice: repeal. The Badgley Report and its indictment of
abortion access would ultimately prove persuasive to the Supreme Court
of Canada, which struck down the criminal abortion law as a violation
of women’s constitutional rights under the Charter in the 1988 landmark
case of R v Morgentaler.
II. ADJUDICATION IN THE COURTS
Morgentaler arose from a civil disobedience campaign waged by Dr. Henry
Morgentaler and other physicians who provided abortion services without
committee certification in facilities without government approval — the
very services to which feminist networks often referred women.48 Civil
disobedience, in contrast to mere defiance of law, is a deliberate and public act aimed to provoke the state in order to challenge its law or policies.49
It is a form of political action.
In the early 1970s, Dr. Morgentaler publicly announced that he had
performed thousands of technically illegal abortions in his Montreal clinic,
and invited the state to prosecute him, which it eventually did.50 The state
study on whether the procedure provided in the Criminal Code for obtaining therapeutic
abortions is operating equitably across Canada.” The Committee conducted interviews
and surveys in each province on the administration of abortion services. The Badgley
report was tabled in the House of Commons on February 9, 1977).
48 HRS Ryan, “Abortion and Criminal Law” (1981) 6:2 Queen’s LJ 362 at 363 (at the time
of one of Dr. Morgentaler’s early trials in Quebec, several hundred physicians practicing
in the Province of Quebec, where there are few hospital committees, published a public
statement to the effect that each had performed a considerable number of abortion without authorization).
49 Marshall Cohen, “Civil Disobedience in a Constitutional Democracy” (1969) 10:2 Mass L
Rev 211 (“[c]ivil disobedience is, then, an appeal to the public to alter certain laws or policies that the minority takes to be incompatible with the fundamental principles of morality, principles that it believes the majority to accept” at 218). See also Kimberley Brownlee,
Conscience and Conviction: The Case for Civil Disobedience (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012) (discussing the legal merits and defensibility of civil disobedience).
50 See Henry Morgentaler, Abortion and Contraception (Don Mills, Ont: General Publishing, 1982); Bernard M Dickens, “The Morgentaler Case: Criminal Process and Abortion
Law” (1976) 14:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 229 (“[t]here is a sense … in which the initial decision to
charge Dr. Morgentaler, reached by the Quebec Minister of Justice and Attorney General,
was a political product of Dr. Morgentaler’s own public challenge to the law. … He adopted
a political posture, and conditioned a political response … the Minister … [took up] the
gauntlet that Dr. Morgentaler consciously and constantly threw down” at 242).
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was otherwise reluctant to act, given that a clandestine market in which
skilled physicians provided safe abortions at private expense worked well
for the state. The ‘physician-abortionist,’ however, also deprived the state
of one of its primary rationales for the criminal law: to protect women
from harm. The civil disobedience campaign pressed the long-held truth
that many abortionists were skilled physicians who provided safe and
respectful care to women abandoned by the law. The maverick physician
of the back alley, in other words, served the public interest. By inviting and
then fighting criminal charges, physicians like Dr. Morgentaler endeavoured to put the law on trial, and in this respect, shared a common cause
with liberation feminists. A national coalition for decriminalization was
formed, which mobilized support for Dr. Morgentaler and other prosecuted physicians outside the courtroom.51
The continuity of constitutional ideas between feminist liberation
direct action, and the physician civil disobedience campaign is evident
in the legal argumentation of Dr. Morgentaler’s defence. When Dr. Morgentaler first reached the Supreme Court in 1975 to defend against the
charge of criminal conspiracy, it was not a rights-based argument that
caught the Court’s attention.52 The issue, rather, that divided the Court
was the defence of necessity, the taking of unlawful action to avoid greater
harm, which Quebec juries would use repeatedly to acquit Dr. Morgentaler
of his admittedly criminal acts. Defense counsel argued that the provision of abortion without committee authorization, outside of accredited
or approved hospitals was necessary to avoid the graver harm of obeying the law. This defence not only echoed the radical, anti-statist spirit of
51 Canadians for Choice (CFC) and Fédération du Québec pour le planning des naissances
(FQPN), Focus on Abortion Services in Quebec (2010), online: <www.fqpn.qc.ca/main/
wp-content/uploads/2015/07/ResearchCFCFQPN2010.pdf> (the Canadian Association
for the Repeal of the Abortion Law, later renamed the Canadian Abortion Rights Action
League/Association Canadienne pour le Droit d’Avortement (CARAL/ACDA), organized
and fronted the coalition. The mandate of CARAL was met in 1988, when the Supreme
Court struck down the abortion law. Though CARAL would survive and continue to lobby
for access to abortion, by 2004 it was replaced by two national organizations: Canadians
for Choice, which focused on raising public awareness and promoting education, and
the Abortion Rights Coalition of Canada/Coalition pour le Droit à l’Avortement au Canada
(ARCC-CDAC), which focused on political activity. Some Quebec organizations were part
of the national campaign, including Front commun pour l’abrogation des lois sur l’avortement (FCALA), the Comité de défense du Dr Morgentaler, and the Quebec section of
Canadian Association for the Repeal of the Abortion Law (CARAL)).
52 Morgentaler v The Queen, [1976] 1 SCR 616, 56 DLR (3d) 161 [Morgentaler 1976 cited to SCR]
(indeed the Court rejected arguments under the Canadian Bill of Rights, SC 1960, c 44 in
parliamentary deference at 632–37, Dickson J).
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liberation feminists, but also their concern for the social inequalities of
the criminal law.53
In the 1976 case before the Supreme Court, Dr. Morgentaler was
charged with performing an abortion for one Miss Parkinson, a 26-year-old
unmarried woman in Canada on a student visa, ineligible for Medicare or
employment benefits. Justice Pigeon, writing for the majority of the Court,
found a total absence of evidence to support the claim that Dr. Morgentaler
could not comply with the law.54 Rather, he attributed a financial motive
to the unlawful acts, finding that Dr. Morgentaler generally performed
abortions not “as an act of charity without a fee, [but] in the course of a
lucrative business.”55 Fees historically played a significant role in criminal
abortion cases in deciding the bona fides of a therapeutic abortion and its
provider.56 Even upon his death, Dr. Morgentaler would not escape the
charge of being a ‘capitalist,’ amassing an untaxed fortune in the abortion
market.57 By acknowledging the exploitation of women in criminal abortion markets, the Court channelled feminist liberation claims of injustice,
yet it would not acknowledge the role of the criminal law itself in creating
and sustaining these conditions of market exploitation.
By focusing on Dr. Morgentaler’s political rather than financial interests,
Justice Dickson, writing in concurrence, came even closer to the constitutional ideas of the liberation feminists. Observing that Dr. Morgentaler
“made no attempt to bring himself within the bounds of legality,”58 Justice
Dickson warned that, “necessity can very easily become simply a mask for
anarchy.”59 Consciously or not, the Court gave voice to the anarchist spirit
of clandestine service provision as political action. Feminist activists and
their physician comrades indeed struggled to save the lives of women in
defiance of state power exercised with indifference to the health and lives
of women. Their actions revealed the dysfunctions and hypocrisy of the law
in its claims to protect women. By demanding access to safe and humane
53 See generally Steven M Bauer and Peter J Eckerstrom, “The State Made Me Do It: The
Applicability of the Necessity Defense to Civil Disobedience”(1987) 39:5 Stan L Rev 1173.
54 Morgentaler 1976, supra note 52 at 659–61, Pigeon J.
55 Ibid at 661, Pigeon J.
56 Gavigan, “‘Bringing on the Menses’”, supra note 14 at 308, n 202 citing Smith & Hogan,
Criminal Law, 4th ed (London: Buttersworth, 1978).
57 Jonathan Kay, “Jonathan Kay: For All His Renown on the Left, Morgentaler Was A Capitalist
Who Saw An Untapped Market”, National Post (29 May 2013), online: <www.news.nationalpost.com>.
58 Morgentaler 1976, supra note 52 at 685, Dickson J.
59 Ibid at 678, citing Southwark London Borough Council v Williams [1971] 1 Ch 734 at 746, 2 All
ER 175, Edmund Davies LJ.
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abortion care, they challenged the authority of the state, disentitling its law
of any claim to legitimacy or obedience. While such action can be claimed
anarchic when judged against the formal rules of law, when inspired and
taken as an effort to enforce a rule of law that extends to the most basic
values inherent in Canada as a free and democratic society, such action is
perhaps better described as “constitutional.”60
This is the view reflected in the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice
Laskin, who called on these constitutional values to defend the necessity
of Dr. Morgentaler’s actions, taken to protect “a friendless young woman,
a native of another country and a comparative stranger in Canada, who
is alone, frightened by her pregnancy and without the means … to invoke
the elaborate procedures of [the law], and who in desperation seeks the
assistance of a qualified surgeon.”61 By rooting his reasoning in the social
vulnerabilities of Miss Parkinson, Justice Laskin acknowledges the social
inequalities of a criminal law that punishes those most in need. Abeyance
of the criminal law becomes, if not a constitutional right, then a necessity
of justice.
A majority of the Supreme Court, however, found the trial judge had
erred in putting the defence of necessity before the jury, and so upheld
the overturning of Dr. Morgentaler’s acquittal. Dr. Morgentaler served
prison time on this criminal charge, but returned to his Montreal practice,
only to be charged and acquitted again as Quebec courts now allowed the
defence of necessity, and juries used it.62 In repeatedly finding no criminal guilt, juries affirmed not the necessity of any single abortion, but the
generalized injustice of the law. Subsequent to a third acquittal, Quebec
simply refused to prosecute further. In 1976, the Parti Québécois came to
power and promised not to proceed with charges against Dr. Morgentaler,
or any other physician providing abortions under safe clinical circumstances, effectively decriminalizing abortion in the province.63
Dr. Morgentaler continued his campaign of civil disobedience, opening
free-standing clinics in Winnipeg and Toronto in 1983. Both clinics were
60 See David Dyzenhaus, “The Deep Structure of Roncarelli v. Duplessis” (2004) 53 UNBLJ
111 at 127–28.
61 Morgentaler 1976, supra note 52 at 650, Laskin CJ.
62 It was in fact not uncommon for juries to refuse to convict in criminal abortion cases, no
matter how overwhelming the evidence. Angus McLaren describes the 1902 case of Rex v
Bella Howe, in which the jury refused to convict a woman for self-induction, as blatantly
ignoring the testimony of doctors, police, and even the accused herself (see McLaren,
“Illegal Operations”, supra note 14 at 808–09).
63 FQPN & CFC, supra note 51 at 15.
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raided, and criminal charges were laid against clinic physicians and staff.64
The Toronto arrest and trial eventually led to the Supreme Court’s landmark Charter judgment, R v Morgentaler (1988). At trial, Dr. Morgentaler
and his co-accused once again argued the defense of necessity: that conspiring to provide abortion services without committee approval and outside of hospitals was necessary to prevent greater harm.65 Feminist social
work activists were called as witnesses to testify to this need.66 Described
as “persons who work within, as best they can, the therapeutic abortion
committee system,” defense counsel Morris Manning called upon them to
“show how that system works, or doesn’t work.”67 Their testimony brought
to life the truly oppressive nature of the legal regime.68 On behalf of their
clients, they would sit on the phone for hours, only to learn that all the
available appointments were gone. The quotas filled. The witnesses knew
of no other therapeutic intervention subject to quotas. They would begin
again the next day, the next week. Yet, the rules were always changing.
There were certain routes, certain negotiations to be made, about which
the average citizen was utterly unaware. The counselors emphasized that
the primary access measure of the system was wealth, not therapeutic need.
Women who paid for the services of a private gynecologist with privileges
at a hospital found greater success. Even family physicians were in on the
racket, asking patients to pay referral fees for the name of such ‘lucky’
gynecologists. Indeed, it is difficult to argue that Dr. Morgentaler stood
to benefit financially from breaking the law, when staying inside the law
was more lucrative. By restricting supply and creating scarcity, the legal
regime perfected the conditions for exploitation, better than any criminal
64 See FL Morton, Morgentaler v Borowski: Abortion, the Charter and the Courts (Toronto:
McClelland & Stewart, 1992) (in Manitoba, as recounted by FL Morton, “[i]n what is presumably the first time in the history of Canadian criminal law, a lawyer had actually gone
to the police and explained that his client wanted to be arrested and charged with violating the Criminal Code” at 159).
65 R v Morgentaler, (1984) 47 OR (2d) 353 at 408, 12 DLR (4th) 502.
66 The complete record filed at the Supreme Court in the 1988 Morgentaler case, including
pleadings filed at each level of court, the exhibits filed at trial, and the complete transcript
from the trial, was made available by the David Asper Center for Constitutional Rights at
the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. The following documents are available on file
with the author: Proceedings: 0105 Motion to Quash; Witness Examinations: 0130 Egan in
Chief; 0171 Egan Cross; 0210 Egan Re-examination; 3287 to 3341 Witness Tripp, Janis Patricia; Final Submissions and Verdict: 3701 Charges and Submission; 3711 Charge to the Jury.
67 Proceedings: 0105 Motion to Quash, supra note 66 at 112.
68 See e.g. Witness Examinations: 0130 Egan in Chief, supra note 66; 0210 Egan Re-examination, supra note 66; 3287 to 3341 Witness Tripp, Janis Patricia, supra note 66.
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market. The prosecution challenged this testimony by seeking to impugn
the character of the witnesses, to reveal them as not health providers but
as political activists.69 Yet, this was precisely the point. They were both.
Morris Manning’s closing statement to the jury suggested they too had
the power to change law, where a law that is supposed to protect people
in fact harms them and where politicians refuse to relieve the injustice.
He called on the jurors to send a message to politicians by acquittal to
stop prosecuting doctors for trying to help people. “That is the message
that has to be delivered and there is only one body in our society that can
deliver that message,” he said. “You can bring freedom, because a jury
is the lamp by which freedom is lit.”70 His statement led Associate Chief
Justice William Parker to instruct the jurors that they were not legislators:
“your duty is to decide the facts and then to apply the law. You are not here
to judge the law and you have no right to do so.”71
The civil disobedience campaign of clandestine clinic providers, however, endeavoured precisely to put the law on trial and with the introduction of the Charter, Mr. Manning could now do so directly. His pre-trial
motion to quash the charges as unconstitutional, or as a violation of Charter
rights, was denied, but the constitutional question reached the Supreme
Court on appeal. Relying on a wealth of documented evidence showing the
dysfunction of the hospital committee regime, including the Badgley Report,
a plurality of the Court declared the 1969 criminal abortion law unconstitutional.72 Five Supreme Court Justices agreed that the criminal law, which
confined abortion to hospitals on committee authorization, endangered
women’s health by delaying or denying access to care in a manner disproportionate to any legitimate aim. The law, therefore, violated section 7 of
the Charter, depriving women of their security of person contrary to the
principles of fundamental justice, a deprivation that could not be saved by
section 1.
Especially striking about this narrow reasoning was that it reflected the
logic of the necessity defense. This was especially true of Justice Beetz’s
opinion, which affirmed that:

69 Witness Examinations: 0171 Egan Cross, supra note 66 at 171–76; 3287 to 3341 Witness
Tripp, Janis Patricia, supra note 66 at 3326–27 (emphasizing that the witnesses are
involved with political organizations, namely OCAC and CARAL).
70 Final Submissions and Verdict: 3701 Charges and Submission, supra note 66 at 3746–47.
71 Final Submissions and Verdict: 3711 Charge to the Jury, at 3851.
72 Morgentaler 1988, supra note 9 at 56–63, 91–101.
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If an act of Parliament forces a person whose life or health is in danger to
choose between, on the one hand, the commission of a crime to obtain
effective and timely medical treatment and, on the other hand, inadequate
treatment or no treatment at all, the right to security of the person has
been violated.73

By this logic, the right to security of the person gives a woman the right to
access safe abortion services where her life or health is at risk. If an Act of
Parliament denies her this right, and forces her to choose between crime
and life, it is Parliament’s act that is unlawful, not her own. The necessity defense, as argued in the criminal case law, was always aimed at this
same end — the repeal of the law. It was never one act or one abortion for
which the physician was forced to defy an otherwise legitimate law. Rather,
because the defense was raised in the context of a civil disobedience campaign, it was intended as a systemic challenge. By reconstituting the necessity defense into constitutional analysis, the Supreme Court channelled
and expressed a liberation feminist view by marking access to abortion as a
symbol of resistance against the state and its unjust laws.
Yet the Supreme Court’s judgment also shaped the constitutional future
of abortion rights in a significant way. Political freedom was narrowed to
a right of safe and timely access to a therapeutic service within a fair and
rational health care system, and only as against direct state constraint. This
is the ruling of Morgentaler (1988) read to its letter, and within its confines, the feminist liberationist spirit languished. This was especially true
because the feminist strand of Morgentaler (1988) that survived was Justice
Wilson’s lone ‘liberty’ opinion, widely endorsed and often taken to represent the Morgentaler (1988) ruling as a whole.74 Justice Wilson agreed that
the dysfunction of the law endangered women’s access to health care, but
she also wrote of a more fundamental flaw. Working in perfect order, the
criminal abortion law takes from a woman a fundamental personal decision of an intimate and private nature, depriving her of the right to develop
her full potential, to plan her own life, and to make her own choices.75 The
criminal law decides for a woman something she has the right to decide for
herself.

73 Ibid at 90, Beetz J.
74 Ibid at 161–84, Wilson J. See Chris Kaposy & Jocelyn Downie, “Judicial Reasoning about
Pregnancy and Choice” (2008) 16:1 Health LJ 281 at 290.
75 Morgentaler 1988, supra note 9 at 171–72, Wilson J.
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Justice Wilson’s reasoning is classically liberal, conceiving of women’s
reproductive freedom as the pursuit of self-interest unencumbered by
state interference. The right to liberty, she wrote, “erect[s] around each
individual, metaphorically speaking, an invisible fence over which the
state will not be allowed to trespass.”76 In this liberal articulation, abortion
rights are defended as a personal choice, rather than a choice structured
by an oppressive capitalist and patriarchal public order. Though Justice
Wilson wrote from the texts of liberal philosophy, many of the national
feminist organizations that supported the civil disobedience campaign,
chief among them the Canadian Abortion Rights Action League (CARAL),
had long before shifted discourse to a liberal frame.77 The rise of liberal
feminism in the 1980s marked a significant departure from liberationist
radicalism of the 1970s. This can be seen in the changing slogans of feminist activism, from “Free Abortion on Demand” to “Free Choice.” Justice
Wilson’s opinion was widely celebrated in feminist circles, received media
attention, and significantly influenced what abortion rights became in the
next era of their constitutionalization.
III. INSTITUTIONALIZATION IN MARKETS AND MEDICINE
Morgentaler 1988 and the liberal abortion rights it fashioned were historically significant in two ways: first, in the campaign to stop re-criminalization,78 and second, in provincial action to prevent decriminalization from
becoming liberalization.79 By restricting public funding to therapeutic
76 Ibid at 164, Wilson J.
77 Jenson, supra note 22 at 46–47; Rebick, supra note 34 at 157. See also Weir, supra note 36
(distinguishing the Left feminist politics of the national Pro-Choice Action Network/
Réseau d’action pro-choix from the liberal politics of CARAL).
78 See R v Morgentaler, [1993] 3 SCR 463, 107 DLR (4th) 537 (liberal abortion rights politically
supported activists in defeating provincial prohibitions on abortion services outside of
hospital settings, such as in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, on the basis of their intentional criminal-like character).
79 See e.g. NS Reg 152/1989 (Nova Scotia prohibited clinic abortions with penal consequences); Medical Act, SNB 1981, c 87, s 56(a) (New Brunswick characterized abortions
outside of hospital settings — criminal offences — as professional misconduct); Medical
Services Payment Act, RSNB 1973, c M-7, s 2.01 (New Brunswick refused to fund non-therapeutic abortions performed in outlawed clinics); Man Reg 46/93, s 28 (Manitoba also regulated abortion funding, excluding all clinic abortions from the public plan); BC Reg 54/88
(British Columbia cut abortion funding except in life-threatening situations); PEI Reg
EC453/96, s1(d)(iv) (PEI cut abortion funding except when medically necessary); Geoffrey
York, “Saskatchewan Limits Abortion Financing,” The Globe and Mail (18 February 1988),
A1 (Saskatchewan also cut abortion funding except in life-threatening situations); Ian T
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abortions performed in hospitals settings, for example, provincial governments repurposed the criminal law to explicitly ration access on the basis of
wealth. Women with the social resources to navigate the system accessed
abortion as therapeutic care under public health insurance schemes, while
others were required to access services in a newly decriminalized market.
The social inequalities of the system were so dire that the federal government argued for re-criminalization as an effort to guarantee universal
access.80
The ‘therapeutic reserve’ in abortion funding regulation clearly reflected
the logic of the 1969 criminal law, which created two categories of abortion: publicly supported therapeutic care and illegal private market transactions. The Morgantaler 1988 judgment did not disturb these categories,
but rather re-inscribed them onto the logic of Charter rights. Women now
enjoyed a security of the person right to access abortion as therapeutic
care. Women also enjoyed the freedom to seek abortion as a private commodity in a newly decriminalized market, an effect of Morgentaler striking
down and Parliament’s failure to re-enact the criminal abortion law. Justice Wilson’s opinion, moreover, turned this market-based freedom into
a constitutional right by expressly articulating abortion as a private right
of personal choice.
The constitutional abortion rights of Morgentaler proved a more powerful tool in the hands of government to deny or restrict public funding, than
in the hands of activists to secure funding. Relying on the rhetorical power
of Morgentaler, activists argued that abortion rights carried with them an
implied right of funding, that any legal right was inseparable from the
means necessary to exercise it.81 Yet, the shift in activist discourse from
‘free abortion’ to ‘free choice,’ and the liberal framing of the abortion right
Urquhart, “Federalism, Ideology, and Charter Review: Alberta’s Response to Morgentaler”
(1989) 4 Can JL & Soc 157 at 160–62 (Alberta originally conditioned funding on physician
approval, but the government later softened the regulation, restricting coverage to abortions carried out by an approved physician, supported by a second opinion of therapeutic
need, in an approved hospital).
80 Haussman, “Of Rights and Power”, supra note 24 at 78–79, 81–82 citing Bill C-43, An Act
respecting abortion, 2nd Sess, 34th Parl, Elizabeth II, 1989–91, 38–39–40 [Bill C-43] (Bill C-43
passed the House of Commons on 29 May 1990, but was defeated by the Canadian Senate
in a tie vote on 31 January 1991. Bill C-43 would have recriminalized abortion unless a
medical practitioner was of the opinion that the health or life of the pregnant woman was
threatened at 2233).
81 Egan & Gardner, “Race, Women’s Health and Reproductive Freedom”, supra note 38 at
305. See also Gail Kellough, Aborting Law: An Exploration of the Politics of Motherhood and
Medicine (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996) at 244–45 (see e.g. argument that
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unhinged or slackened this pairing. Sheila Shaver describes this outcome as
the contradiction of liberalism in reproductive rights: the identification of
reproductive freedom with the free market rather than state intervention,
with the private rather than the public sphere.82 In the most basic terms, a
‘right to choose’ guarantees a woman exercise of her will, control over her
body, and free pursuit of her interests. Her rights rest with her as an individual, secure from state interference. As an individual, however, she is also
equal to all others, and so also vulnerable to the competing rights of others.
This includes the taxpayer as a generalized other, Shaver explains, who may
refuse to share in collective support of abortion access.83
This is precisely what happened at the provincial level. In the 1990s,
clinic picketers in New Brunswick carried signs reading, ‘Not with my tax
dollars.’84 In Ontario, investigative journalists warned “unsuspecting” taxpayers of the “millions of dollars” they have been “forking-out” to support
the Toronto-based Morgentaler clinic.85 In Manitoba, an activist group,
“Defund Abortion,” assembled before the Manitoba Legislative Building to
demand an end to public funding.86 Political responses have been a little
more measured, voiced in the sustainability of Medicare and the need to
ration public health care dollars. In Charter litigation in Manitoba, for
example, the government fought a constitutional obligation to fund clinic
services on the claim that otherwise abortion rights allowed individual
choice to trump social policy, entitling “everyone … to healthcare service
based upon the time of their choosing.”87 Some feminist groups shared
this concern, questioning whether Charter litigation on abortion funding

82
83
84

85
86
87

‘choice’ is not an individual right, but an ‘enabling term,’ which often requires collective
support for its implementation).
Sheila Shaver, “Body Rights, Social Rights and the Liberal Welfare State” (1993) 13:3
Critical Social Policy 66, 69–70.
Ibid at 71.
Lianne McTavish, “The Cultural Production of Pregnancy: Bodies and Embodiment at a
New Brunswick Abortion Clinic” (2008) 20 TOPIA 23 at 29. See also Ackerman, A Region
at Odds, supra note 30 (“[w]hile Canadians were divided over whether tax funding should
cover abortions, residents of the Maritime region strongly opposed using their tax dollars
for the procedure” at 192).
Judi McLeod, “$5-Million Man”, Canada Free Press (14 September 1999), online: <www.
canadafreepress.com>.
“Abortion Debate Reignites on Steps of Manitoba Legislature”, CBC News (03 October 2013),
online: <www.cbc.ca>.
Terence Moore, “The Right to Health”, The Winnipeg Free Press (28 January 2005), A10;
Thomson, supra note 31 at 110 (Manitoba defended its long-standing refusal to fund clinic
services on the argument that it would not support health care privatization). See also
Stachiw, supra note 42 at 202.
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was a good idea, or whether it would lead to greater privatization in the
system.88 Their concern proved warranted.
In 2005, the Supreme Court decided Chaoulli v Quebec, striking down a
legislative restriction on private health insurance as a violation of Charter
rights.89 The case became a flashpoint for market-modeled liberty in Canadian constitutional health care analysis.90 The rhetoric of the majority
judgment in Chaoulli is one of saving, not dismantling, Medicare, albeit
through the enforcement of Charter rights as consumer choice.91 Chief
Justice McLachlin and Justice Major, writing in concurrence, grounded
their analysis on the Charter right to security of the person, and the precedent set in Morgentaler 1988. They reasoned that the state had created
“a virtual monopoly for the public health scheme … [and] effectively limited access to private health care except for the very rich.”92 This state
monopoly resulted in delays and denials of care, except for the wealthy
few who could pay for private care, typically outside the country. The reasoning tracks Morgentaler 1988, especially in the access crisis under legal
constraint, but its conclusion for the relative roles of governments and
markets is more direct. The fact that the state holds a monopoly on services the market can better provide commends itself to an opening of competitive markets in health care.
This is the contradiction of liberal rights. Not only do they fail to ensure
social equality in access, they undermine its guarantee by cutting a constitutional path to privatization. In this liberal tradition, the constitutionalizing of abortion not only decriminalized the market in abortion services,
it affirmed a competitive private market as the means of rights fulfillment,
and thereby acceded to its rationalities and inequalities.93 The liberal
abortion right of Morgentaler 1988, carried forward by a liberal feminist
88 Johnstone, After Morgentaler, supra note 9 at 99.
89 2005 SCC 35, [2005] 1 SCR 791 [Chaoulli].
90 See Joan M Gilmour, “Fallout from Chaoulli: Is It Time to Find Cover” (2006) 44:2 Osgoode
Hall LJ 327 (examines Chaoulli as an example of the increasing prevalence of normalizing
privatization and individual responsibility in Canadian health policy). See also Colleen M
Flood, Kent Roach & Lorne Sossin, eds, Access to Care, Access to Justice: The Legal Debate Over
Private Health Insurance in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005).
91 Chaoulli, supra note 89 at para 97, Deschamps J.
92 Ibid at para 106 McLachlin CJ and Major J.
93 Richard Robison, “Neo-Liberalism and the Market State: What is the Ideal Shell?” in
Richard Robison, ed, The Neo-Liberal Revolution: Forging the Market State (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) 3 (describing how citizenship is redefined in terms of the “right to
participate in the market” and equality as “access to the market”). See also Wendy Brown,
Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (New York: Zone Books, 2015).
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movement, legitimized the withdrawal of the state, the privatization of
abortion care, and all the social inequalities of access that followed.94
Within this new political context, feminist activists shifted discursive
strategy and sought to rework the abortion right to secure access and
equality. They claimed, and provincial governments contested, that abortion services are not market commodities. Rather, all abortions are therapeutic care, or in Canadian health care discourse, a ‘medically necessary’
service. The appeal of this claim is obvious. On reclassification as therapeutic care, abortion is fully absorbed into the public health care system,
to be treated and funded like every other health care service. The material
achievement of the claim was comprehensive funding, but its constitutional consequences were more tenuous. The politics of abortion became
the politics of health care.95 The label “medical necessity” replaced the
slogan of “choice.” Abortion rights, Melissa Haussman argues, were “de-
gendered and de-politicized.”96
National women’s organizations, for example, began working in and
through mainstream political discourse and institutions. In the 1990s,
activists enlisted a Liberal federal government to politically coerce provincial funding reform under the Canada Health Act (CHA).97 As a federal
spending statute, the CHA establishes national criteria that provincial
health insurance plans must satisfy to qualify for federal contributions.98
In this sense, Medicare is neither a legal obligation of governments nor
a legal right of individuals.99 Nonetheless, its commitment to a universal
needs-based system strongly reflects the social democratic values of the

94 See Lessard, “The Construction of Health Care”, supra note 13 at 141–42.
95 Shaver, supra note 82 at 83. See also Clare Bambra, Debbie Fox & Alex Scott-Samuel,
“Towards a Politics of Health” (2005) 20:2 Health Promotion Intl 187.
96 Melissa Haussman, “‘What Does Gender Have to Do with Abortion Law?’ Canadian
Women’s Movement-Parliamentary Interactions on Reform Attempts, 1969-91” (2000) 21
Intl J Can Studies 127 at 130.
97 Canada Health Act, RSC 1985, c C-6.
98 Ibid, ss 2, 7.
99 For discussion of positive health rights under the Charter, see Colleen M Flood & YY Brandon Chen, “Charter Rights & Health Care Funding: A Typology of Canadian Health Rights
Litigation” (2010) 19:3 Ann Health L 479; Matthew Rottier Voell, “PHS Community Services
Society v Canada (Attorney General): Positive Health Rights, Health Care Policy, and Section
7 of the Charter” (2012) 31 Windsor Rev Legal Soc Issues 41; Mel Cousins, “Health Care
and Human Rights After Auton and Chaoulli” (2009) 54:4 McGill LJ 717; Martha Jackman,
“Charter Review of Health Care Access,” in Joanna Erdman, Vanessa Gruben & Erin Nelson,
Health Law and Policy in Canada, 5th ed (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2017) 71).
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Charter.100 In many ways, feminist activists advocated for abortion funding reform less on the formal entitlements of the CHA than on its constitutional spirit and values. Materially, however, the activists found little
success. The status of abortion under the CHA is controversial, namely
whether abortion is a medically necessary service and therefore subject
to the terms of the Act. Even when provincial governments have reformed
funding policies, many denied any legal obligation to do so, claiming the
designation of a health service, as an insured service, is solely within provincial discretion.101 In the 1990s, Federal Health Minister, Diane Marleau,
wrote to all provinces explaining that their failure to cover private clinic
fees for medically necessary services, including abortion, contravened
the CHA and that provinces would face financial penalty unless they fully
funded the services.102 This intervention was in part an effort to address
the larger issue of privatization in the Canadian health care system. Some
provinces complied with the terms of the Minister’s letter, while others
simply took the financial hit. Federal Health Ministers since have warned,
threatened, and even initiated administrative action against provinces,
but little was gained.103 The channelling of feminist activism through the
100 Antonia Maioni, “Citizenship and Health Care in Canada” (2010) 42 Intl J Can Studies
225. See also Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, Building on Values: The
Future of Health Care in Canada, Final Report, Cat No CP32-85/2002E-IN (Commissioner:
Roy J Romanow) (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2002).
101 See Fine, supra note 7 (in the recent PEI abortion challenge, for example, the provincial
government made repeated claims of legal compliance with the CHA. Even on yielding
to the constitutional challenge, Premier MacLauchlan denied the Canada Health Act any
legal force, repeating that “government has the right to decide what health-care services
are available under the Canada Health Act”).
102 Letter from Diane Marleau, Minister of National Health and Welfare to provincial and territorial Ministers of Health (6 January 1995), online: Abortion Rights Coalition of Canada
<www.arcc-cdac.ca/backrounders/HC-letter-Jan1995.pdf >. See also Canada, Minister of
National Health and Welfare, “Statement by the Honourable Diane Marleau” (16 October
1995), online: Abortion Rights Coalition of Canada <www.arcc-cdac.ca/backrounders/
HC-letter-Oct1995.pdf>.
103 In 2001, Federal Health Minister Allan Rock specifically warned the PEI government that
failure to fund clinic abortion services constituted a violation of the CHA, and threatened to withhold transfer payments unless abortion was treated like all other medically
insured services, regardless of where they were performed (see Laura Eggerston, “Abortion Services in Canada: a Patchwork Quilt with Many Holes” (2001) 164:6 CMAJ 847). In
2004, former Federal Minister of Health Ujjal Dosanjh sent a letter to New Brunswick’s
provincial Department of Health and Wellness, initiating an official dispute avoidance
resolution process to address the funding restriction on clinic abortion services. The New
Brunswick Minister of Health and Wellness, Elvy Robichaud, declared that the province
would not “bow to pressure” from the federal Liberals and refused to engage in talks. The
matter ended with a change in government, and the new Minister, Tony Clement, chose
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CHA did, however, result in a discursive shift in abortion rights. Public
litigation over abortion funding in the 1990s and into the 2000s took on
qualities of a management disagreement — the same market rationality
that dominated constitutional health care analysis generally. Although
Charter arguments were raised in these cases, they were either dismissed
on technical grounds or avoided on narrow administrative grounds.104 The
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association challenged provincial funding restrictions as “180 degrees opposed to the spirit of the decision of
the Canadian Supreme Court [in Morgentaler 1988].”105 Yet, the provincial
Supreme Court invalidated the regulation on a technical point, offering
the government an alternative way to achieve its policy end.106
All provincial governments eventually reformed or repealed funding
restrictions enacted immediately before or after Morgentaler 1988 and
abortion care was slowly absorbed into Medicare to be treated and funded
not to pursue the matter (see Johnstone, After Morgentaler, supra note 9 at 116; Health
Canada, Canada Health Act: Annual Report 2005-2006, Cat No HI-2/2006E (Ottawa: Minister of Health, 2006) at 10–11). In 2016, Federal Health Minister Jane Philpott affirmed that
women “should have access to reproductive health services, no matter where they live in
our country,” but refrained from taking any enforcement action under the CHA to make
this a reality (see Anna Mehler Paperny, “Health Minister ‘Will be Checking’ on Provinces’
Abortion Access Plans”, Global News (23 February 2016), online: <www.globalnews.ca>).
104 In 2004, the Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench ruled on summary judgment that the government’s funding restriction on clinic services violated women’s Charter rights, using
Morgentaler 1988, supra note 9 as precedent. The Court of Appeal, however, set aside the
judgment, concluding that the significant policy implications of the case required a more
complete evidentiary record (see Jane Doe 1 v Manitoba, 2004 MBQB 285, 189 Man R (2d)
284). In 2006, Dr. Morgentaler challenged the New Brunswick Medical Services Payment Act,
supra note 79, regulation, which excludes abortions performed in non-hospital settings
from government funding as a violation of Charter rights; however, the case languished in
the courts after a long, but successful, battle over public interest standing (see Morgentaler
v New Brunswick, 2009 NBCA 26, 344 NBR (2d) 39). For a full description of the case, see
Rachael Johnstone, “The Politics of Abortion in New Brunswick” (2014) 36:2 Atlantis 73
[Johnstone, “Politics of Abortion”]). The only successful judgment during this time was
a Quebec class action that concerned government reimbursement for failure to cover
full clinic fees over a ten-year period. Although Charter violations were argued, the case
was again decided on narrow statutory terms of the provincial health insurance act (see
Association pour l’accès à l’avortement c Québec (Procureur général), 2006 QCCS 4694, [2006]
RJQ 1938). For a discussion of cases see generally, Joanna N Erdman, “In the Back Alleys
of Health Care: Abortion, Equality and Community in Canada” (2007) 56 Emory LJ 1093;
Rachael Johnstone & Emmett Macfarlane, “Public Policy, Rights, and Abortion Access in
Canada” (2015) 51 IJCS 97.
105 Thomson, supra note 31 at 170.
106 See British Columbia Civil Liberties Assn v British Columbia (Attorney General) (1998), 24
BCLR (2d) 189, 49 DLR (4th) 493.
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like any health care service. Yet, as abortion care integrated into the health
system, its political aspirations changed more than they changed the system. The direct service provision of feminist activism under the criminal
law was an alternative to the hospital committee system, both in securing
access to services, but also in the experience of care. This was part of the
feminist liberation agenda to assist women in defiance of state authority, and especially for radical feminists, in defiance of patriarchal medical
authority. After decriminalization, several feminist groups opened clinics
modeled on a feminist ethic of care, but these revolutionary aims were
generally quieted in activism for public funding in an effort to have abortion treated like any other health care service.
Linda Briskin describes this trajectory as “mainstreaming,” feminist
alternative organizations coming to reproduce the very norms they set out
to reject, just to survive.107 To secure public funding, for example, abortion
rights appropriated the therapeutic designation of the former criminal law
as a “medically necessary” service. Counselling also remains a core part of
feminist abortion care, but it looks different today. Whereas counselling
once served political emancipatory ends through critical consciousness-
raising and movement-building, it now serves individual dignity and autonomy through a generic health care right of free and informed consent. To
respect abortion as an empowered decision of a woman can be deeply
respectful and affirming of women’s worth, equality, and even liberation.
Yet the individualizing of abortion risks universalizing it: the act comes to
mean one thing for all women, a caricature which keeps its complex and
contradictory realities out of sight. As such a woman with the freedom to
choose, marked by full and equal access to abortion care, carries all the
power to choose the life she wishes to lead, but also all the responsibility
for the burdens of her life.108 Though women use abortion to survive and
even thrive in lives marked by poverty and violence, the ways in which
they would ascribe meaning to this choice may compete with or collapse under its assumptive freedom. By asking women to take responsibility, even pride, in the decision, no matter how severe the constraints
or unjust the conditions under which they act, the individualizing of

107 Briskin, supra note 12 at 94.
108 Kate Gleeson, “The Limits of ‘Choice’: Abortion and Entrepreneurialism” in Meredith
Nash, ed, Reframing Reproduction: Conceiving Gendered Experiences (New York: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2014) 69.
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abortion disappears oppressive social and economic structures.109 This
is another instance of the privatizing impulse in Canadian health and
social policy.
Feminist action turned inward, toward the private, personal space that
liberal abortion rights carved for it, rather than outwards towards public and political action.110 Constitutional abortion rights, in other words,
failed to institutionalize into the Canadian health care system a vision
of abortion care in the tradition of feminist liberation. That vision was
never simply to provide free and safe abortion care to meet immediate
need, although of course, this was always a part of direct service activism.
Rather, the vision was to use the moment of meeting peoples’ needs to
raise critical consciousness about the underlying causes of those needs.
The goal was to improve the lives of women by enlisting them in a movement to change the conditions of their lives: health care as political action.
Rarely does the “constitutional road not taken” present itself for comparison. Yet, the history of abortion rights in Canada affords such an opportunity in the divergent path of Quebec liberation feminists, who supported
but did not take an active role in the national campaign to repeal the criminal law. In the late 1970s, with the provincial promise not to prosecute,
activists who organized under the Coordination nationale pour l’avortement
libre et gratuit established and expanded abortion services in community
health centers, which the Quebec government funded as part of its welfare
program.111 Like clandestine direct action service provisions in other parts
of Canada, community-based abortion care was a political act to recognize
that “[p]roviding free abortions on demand … is not just one more service
to the rest of our programs or interventions in family planning. Rather, it
is taking a stand in a long and heated legal and political debate.”112 Today,
Quebec is an exception in abortion access — 46 of 94 abortion facilities in

109 Barbara Cruikshank, The Will to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other Subjects (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); Bob Pease, “Rethinking Empowerment: A Postmodern Reappraisal for Emancipatory Practice” (2002) 32:2 Brit J Soc Work 135.
110 See Adamson, Briskin & McPhail, supra note 35 at 198 (for a discussion of the contradictory contribution of the ‘personal is political’).
111 FQPN & CFC, supra note 51 at 17–18. See also: Nora Milne, Creating Change to Maintaining
Change: The Fédération du Québec pour le planning des naissances and the Pro-choice Movement
(MA Thesis, McGill University, 2011).
112 FQPN & CFC, supra note 51 at 18 (citing CLSC practitioners).
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Canada are located in the province, with social equality in access credited
largely to the provincial health policy of the 1970s.113
The community-based health centers in Quebec afforded an alternative strategy, which feminist activists soon began to replicate in the rest
of Canada: working with, rather than against, provincial governments to
secure social equality in abortion access.114 In the early 1980s, activists
began to lobby provincial governments to accredit or approve free-standing clinics as hospital facilities for the lawful provision of services.115 The
Ontario Coalition for Abortion Clinics (OCAC), a leading proponent of
the strategy, explained as follows: “[Clandestine] clinics have been indispensable in providing desperately needed services to thousands of women,
in dramatizing daily how unfair and unworkable the existing law is …. At
the same time, clinics can be posed as a model for the future: centres providing care for the full spectrum of women’s reproductive lives.”116 OCAC
campaigned to repeal the federal law, but also petitioned the province of
Ontario to legalize and fund community-based clinics. Abortion provision
through these clinics represented not only political resistance against an
unjust law, but a political future for a just health care system:
We live in a world where inadequate wages make women the largest percentage of the poor, where racism is systemic, where women are subject
to rape and violence, sexual and racial harassment, and still bear the major
responsibility for domestic work and childcare. It is in this context … for all
women regardless of class, race, ability or sexuality to truly have choices in
our society, we require: safe and effective birth control with information
and services in our own languages and in our own communities, decent
jobs, paid parental leave, free childcare, the right to live freely and openly
as lesbians, an end to forces or coerced sterilization, employment equity,
an end to sexual and racial harassment, the right to have the children we

113 See Wendy V Norman et al, “Abortion Health Services in Canada: Results of a 2012
National Survey” (2016) 62:4 Can Fam Physician e209.
114 See generally Achsah Turnbull, Abortion Access Restricted: The Effect of the Division of Powers
on Abortion Services in Canada (MA Thesis, University of Ottawa, 2014).
115 Carolyn Egan, “Twenty-Five Years On: How We Won Abortion Rights”, Rabble (23 January 2013), online: <www.rabble.ca>. See also Patricia Antonyshyn, B Lee & Alex Merrill, “Marching for Women’s Lives: The Campaign for Free-Standing Abortion Clinics in
Ontario” in Frank Cunningham et al, eds, Social Movements/Social Change: The Politics and
Practice of Organizing (Toronto: Between the Lines, Society for Socialist Studies, 1988) 129
at 130.
116 Antonyshyn, Lee & Merrill, supra note 115 at 149.
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choose to have, and the right to full access to free abortion. All of these
must be achieved if we are truly to have reproductive freedom.117

OCAC worked in a tradition of reproductive justice, which endeavours
to reveal a political space beyond access to services, a space in which to
build social institutions in the public interest that speak to a community’s
diverse needs and values: “abortion rights can never be put forward as a
single issue separated from other struggles.”118 Community-based abortion care ultimately seeks to return democratic power to communities.119
Many feminist activists outside of Quebec were successful in establishing community women’s health clinics. The Women’s Health Clinic in
Winnipeg, Manitoba, was among the first, providing a mixed program of
services, advocacy, and community action. As explained in their model of
care, “[t]he woman, in the context of her community, is the centre of … service planning and delivery … [on the] understanding that … women’s health
status is influenced by a variety of social and structural factors, including
social status, income and employment, education, and social supports.”120
Even more interesting, Canadian feminists appear to be returning to the
model in more recent activism. After the Morgentaler clinic in Fredericton, New Brunswick closed in the Spring of 2014, feminist activists mobilized through a crowd sourcing campaign to “Save the Clinic,” re-opening
Clinic 554 as a community-based reproductive health centre.121 Moreover,
the activists campaigned in a distinctly reproductive justice discourse.
Their stated goal was “evidence-based policy about abortion care, and
that includes services that are located within the community and are
117 Egan & Gardner, “Race, Class and Reproductive Freedom,” supra note 38 at 96, citing
Carolyn Egan, “The Right to Choose” (1985) 4:4 Our Times 30 at 30.
118 Ibid at 97; see also Luna Zakiya & Kristin Luker, “Reproductive Justice” (2013) 9 Annual
Rev L & Social Science 327; Loretta J Ross & Rickie Solinger, Reproductive Justice: A Primer
(Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2017).
119 On the political goals of community-based health centers see H Jack Geiger, “The First
Community Health Centers: A Model of Enduring Value” (2005) 28:4 J Ambulatory Care
Management 313; D Brad Wright, “Social Justice and Community Health Centers: Commitment to One Gave Rise to the Other” (2005) 16:4 J Health Care for Poor & Underserved 607.
120 Women’s Health Clinic, “Models of Care” (1998) at 2, 4, online: <womenshealthclinic.org/
wp-content/uploads/2013/10/WHC-Model-Of-Care.pdf>.
121 See Choix NB Choice, Press Release, “RJNB Crowdfunding Information” (4 July 2014),
online: <choixnbchoice.org>; Government of New Brunswick, Press Release, “Provincial
Government Removes Barriers to a Woman’s Right to Choose” (26 November 2014),
online: <www.gnb.ca>, citing New Brunswick Regulation 2014-160, OC 2014-44, (2015) NB
Gaz, 56 (Medical Services Payment Act) (despite regulatory change in January 2015, public
funding for abortion in New Brunswick remains restricted to hospital-based services).
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delivered within a broader holistic and more preventive model of reproductive health care .… Access to safe abortion services is critical to health,
but it is only one component of a full reproductive justice agenda that has
been ignored for too long in [New Brunswick].” 122 Even if constitutional
abortion rights today appear divorced from the real and material needs of
women’s lives, and the social and economic institutions that shape them,
the New Brunswick activism shows the imprint of feminist liberation
struggles to be drawn upon in the forging of new constitutional claims for
the future.
CONCLUSION: A COLLECTIVE DEMOCRATIC FUTURE
What is the constitutional future for abortion rights in Canada? The lesson of constitutional abortion rights in Canada is in their capacity to be
reimagined again and again.
Shortly after Morgentaler 1988, Hester Lessard imagined a possible
future for abortion rights focused on the political capacity of their holders
to make a claim against the state for more than access to a single healthcare service.123 She imagined abortion rights as democratic rights — to fully
and equally participate in and benefit from the social institutions of the
state, the health care system among them. Lessard saw this future in Justice Wilson’s liberty opinion in Morgentaler 1988, when she focused on
women’s reproductive liberty as a collective struggle for inclusion in society, rather than exclusion from the state. Justice Wilson wrote that the
decision to terminate a pregnancy “is one that will have profound psychological, economic and social consequences for the pregnant woman …. It is
a decision that deeply reflects the way the woman thinks about herself and
her relationship to others and to society at large.”124 Seldom emphasized
in the opinion of Justice Wilson is the way in which she linked the private
right of reproductive freedom to the heart of the democratic political tradition, a prerequisite of legitimate government no less than the traditional
122 Reproductive Justice New Brunswick/Justice Reproductive Nouveau Brunswick, Press
Release, “Re: Clinic 554/ Communiqué de Presse” (16 January 2015), online: <rjnb.org>. See
also Joanne H Wright, “What the New Liberal Government Should Know About ‘Reproductive Freedom and Justice in New Brunswick’” (2014) 5 JNB Studies 15; Johnstone, “The
Politics of Abortion”, supra note 104.
123 See Hester Lessard, “Relationship, Particularity, and Change: Reflections on R v
Morgentaler and Feminist Approaches to Liberty” (1991) 36:2 McGill LJ 263 [Lessard,
“Relationship, Particularity, and Change”].
124 Morgentaler 1988, supra note 9 at 171.
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civil and political rights of man: “the right [of individuals] to choose their
own religion and their own philosophy of life, the right to choose with
whom they will associate and how they will express themselves, the right
to choose where they will live and what occupation they will pursue.”125
Lessard saw great potential in the conception of abortion rights as a claim
for democratic inclusion and participation, namely in the different view of
the state it entails, “one in which state power is the mediator and facilitator of rights rather than antithetical to freedom .… The language of rights
becomes the language of democratic interrelationships rather than the
language of separation and boundaries.”126
In this construction of abortion rights, women’s rights to reproductive liberty, security and equality are extricable from empowerment within
political and public life. Abortion rights mediate the relationship between
women and the state, and thereby shape the use of its power for women’s
security, equality, and freedom in the public interest. Other scholars have
written of a democratic vision for Charter rights in health care, but reproductive justice activists are giving legal form to this future.127 In 2016, a
group of PEI activists persuaded their government to adopt a new understanding of constitutional abortion rights, conferring upon it the authority to act and to reform a decades old restrictive policy.128
This policy threatened reproductive freedom not by state interference,
but rather state indifference. The province’s abortion policy required
women to seek and access services over the Confederation Bridge, in
neighbouring provinces, with minimal state resources or support.129 It
was this state indifference to the health and lives of PEI women that the
activists challenged as a violation of the Charter. Rather than disavow the
liberal legacy of Morgentaler 1988 and the abortion rights it affirmed, they
grafted onto it the historical weight of feminist thinking and activism in
this country. They added new ideas to old paradigms, or rather old ideas to
125 Ibid at 166.
126 Lessard, “Relationship, Particularity, and Change”, supra note 123 at 306.
127 See Alana Klein, “So Long as You Have Your Health: Health Care Distribution in Canada”
(2012) 30:2 Windsor YB Access Just 247; Jackman, supra note 99. See also Johnstone, After
Morgentaler, supra note 9 at 156–66 (advancing an argument for the recognition of reproductive rights as essential to women’s equal citizenship).
128 The following analysis draws upon Joanna N Erdman, “A Constitutional Future for Abortion Rights in Canada” (2017) 54:3 Alta L Rev 727 [Erdman, “Constitutional Future”].
See also Kate McKenna, No Choice: The 30-Year Fight for Abortion on Prince Edward Island
(Blackpoint, NS: Fernwood Publishing, 2018).
129 See Erdman, “Constitutional Future”, supra note 128 at 732–37 (description of the former
policy).
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contemporary paradigms, in the reshaping and reclaiming of constitutional
abortion rights as a renewed source of democratic power. They argued
that the abortion policy was constitutionally unjust, not only because of
its impact on women’s individual rights to liberty, security, and equality,
but more fundamentally, because of its democratic effects on the status of
Island women as full and equal members of public and political life.
When claiming Charter rights of liberty, the activists claimed not only
for the right to make personal decisions of an intimate and private nature.
On the contrary, this was a liberty the state too willingly gave women in
its withdrawal of public support and in the privatization of abortion care.
Thus, one of the first tasks the activists undertook in their challenge was
to highlight the elaborate state administration of abortion in order to demonstrate how the government was deeply implicated in the withdrawal of
local hospital services, the obstruction of new clinic-based services, and
the funding and referral of out-of-province services to quell criticism and
avoid reform on the Island.130 The activists challenged the government’s
simple claim that market forces explained the lack of local services. They
refused to alleviate the government of responsibility for the privatization
of care and resulting social inequalities in access.
When claiming section 7 Charter right of security of person, the activists again claimed abortion rights, not as an entitlement to a discrete health
service in the protection of health, but against a government policy that
endangered the health and lives of women and the government’s seeming indifference to that fact.131 In other words, the activists put the law on
trial. The narratives of the ways in which the abortion policy worked in
practice — that women without family physicians had little hope of navigating the province’s abortion rules and regulations, and that many as a
consequence were pushed outside the system, some into safe private care,
others toward unsafe clandestine practice — recalled all of the dysfunctions and hypocrisy of the hospital committee system under the former
criminal law.132 The activists bore witness to this injustice against a govern130 Ibid at 733.
131 Ibid at 745–47.
132 See Colleen MacQuarrie, Jo-Ann MacDonald & Cathrine Chambers, “Trials and Trails of
Accessing Abortion in PEI: Reporting on the Impact of PEI’s Abortion Policies” (Charlottetown: University of Prince Edward Island, 2014), online: <projects.upei.ca/cmacquarrie/
files/2014/01/trials_and_trails_final.pdf> (this evidence was largely based on a 2014 study of
women’s first-person accounts in seeking and accessing abortion services under the policy.
Other testimonial accounts of women’s experiences followed the release of the study). See
also: The Sovereign Uterus, (blog), online: <www.thesovereignuterus.wordpress.com>
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ment refusal to carry out any investigation of abortion practice under its
policy, affirming only that, by its knowledge, there are no illegal ‘back-alley’
abortions in PEI.133
In homage to the necessity defence of the civil disobedience trials of
Morgentaler, the activists argued that it was not clandestine abortion that
endangered women’s health and lives, but the law itself, the abortion policy.
Women survived this policy without harm to the extent they did because
an army of local activists worked the shadows of the broken system, took
its outflow, and assisted women to find safe services, precisely as they
had under the criminal regime.134 Against these facts, the activists argued
government malfeasance in the maintaining and enforcing of a policy that
caused harm. This was not a novel claim, but tracked the argument of
defense counsel and ultimately the reasoning of the Supreme Court in
Morgentaler 1988.135 To provide abortion services, or any other health care
service in ways that deny or delay safe access, or otherwise breeds conditions for unsafe access, infringes on the right to security of person. The
activists raised the constitutional argument beyond mere bodily harm by
emphasizing the democratic effects of this harm: that as a principle of fundamental justice, and as full and equal members of Canadian society, the
lives and health of women have worth and must be accounted for in the
design and delivery of health care under a public system.136
Partly in answer to these criticisms of its policy, the provincial government took efforts to improve access through information, travel support,
and expanding out-of-province eligible services. The assumption was that
if the policy could be made to work, it would present no constitutional
affront. The activists disagreed. A policy that required its residents to leave
PEI to access abortion care, no matter how comfortable the journey, is

133
134
135

136

(contains anonymous narrative accounts of women’s experiences in navigating the regulatory system); Teresa Wright, “P.E.I. Women Share Harrowing Abortion Stories”, The
Guardian (30 May 2015), online: <www.theguardian.pe.ca>; Anna Mehler Paperny, “Your
Stories: Navigating Canada’s Abortion Provider Patchwork”, Global News (5 January 2016),
online: <www.globalnews.ca>.
“Lack of Abortion Access Fuels Risks to Women, Says Report”, CBC News (28 January
2014), online: <www.cbc.ca>.
Alison Auld, “P.E.I. Women Continue to Face Barriers to Abortion Despite Easing of
Restrictions”, The Toronto Star (27 December 2015), online: <www.thestar.com>.
The same argument has since found favour with the Supreme Court in Canada (Attorney
General) v Bedford, 2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 SCR 1101; Canada (Attorney General) v PHS
Community Services Society, 2011 SCC 44, [2011] 3 SCR 134; Carter v Canada (Attorney
General), 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 SCR 331.
AAN Application, supra note 6 at paras 143–45.
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constitutionally offensive because of the normative view it communicates
about women as members of the democratic order.137 The activists invoked
equality rights under section 15 of the Charter, enlivened by the spirit and
values of Medicare and the CHA, to argue for the legislative entitlement
of all Islanders to a single, integrated health care system, grounded in evidence-based decision-making, and focused on improving health, enhancing
access, and local delivery.138 The abortion policy was none of these things.
By relying on the universal promise of health care in provincial legislation,
the activists claimed abortion rights not against state intervention, but as
a means to enforce that intervention, a claim on the state and its protections.139 The activists endeavoured to enforce the democratic promise of
legislation for the benefit of all those subject to it, women included. This is
why the identity of “Island Women” became vital to the Charter challenge.
The women reclaimed their status as Islanders and their constitutional
rights as public interests.140
In their public campaign and formal legal challenge, the PEI activists
claimed abortion rights as democratic rights, that is, as claims on the state to
build its institutions in the collective interest. They claimed abortion rights
for more than access to a single health care service. They claimed abortion
rights as democratic rights: the right to fully and equally participate in, and
to benefit from, the institutions of the state, the health care system among
them. They claimed reproductive justice as constitutional justice.
This case on a small Island portends of a big constitutional future
for abortion rights, namely the capacity to carry forward the visions of
democratic movements for a socially just world. In this case, the PEI government reformed its abortion policy not because of judicial review, but
because of women’s collective demands for justice. Constitutional rights
come into being by no one paradigm, in no one place, and at no one time.
That is the lesson of 35 years of the Charter and 150 years of the Constitution.

137 See Erdman, “Constitutional Future”, supra note 128 at 748–51. See also Joanna N Erdman
“The Law of Stigma, Travel, and the Abortion-Free Island” (2016) 33:1 Colum J Gender & L
29 [Erdman, “The Law of Stigma”].
138 Erdman, “Constitutional Future”, supra note 128 at 737–42.
139 The activists made a claim of entitlement to health care only in this respect: once the state
provides a benefit, namely, local and safe access to health care, it is obligated to do so in a
non-discriminatory manner, which may require extending the scope of benefits to include
local abortion services (see e.g. Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 SCR
624, 38 BCLR (3d) 1).
140 Erdman, “The Law of Stigma”, supra note 137 at 34–36.
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